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Abstract
The widely recognised transparency and openness since 1997 of the
monetary policymaking process at the Bank of England has provided
very detailed information on both the decisions of individual members
of the Monetary Policy Committee and the information on which they
are based. In this paper we conisder this decision making process in
the context of a model in which inflation forecast targeting is used but
there is heterogeneity among the members of the committee. We find
that internally generated forecasts of output and market generated
expectations of medium term inflation provide the best description
of discrete changes in interest rates. We also find a role for asset
prices through the equity market and housing prices. There is also
identifiable forms of heterogeneity among members of the committee
that improves the predictability of interest rate changes. This can
be thought of as supporting the argument that full transparency of
monetary policy decision making can be welfare enhancing.
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1 Introduction
The practice of targeting inflation directly has been adopted since the early
1990s by a number of Central Banks to the extent that this is now the de facto
standard for monetary policy in many industrialised countries. Both the US
Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank have remained exceptions
to this rule.
Since 1997 the model within the UK has been to grant the Bank of Eng-
land control over short term interest rates with the instruction that it is to
target inflation at 2.5% (and more recently 2%). In addition the Governor
of the Bank must write an open letter of explanation to the Chancellor if
inflation falls outside a 1% band on either side of this target. Despite the
emphasis on inflation current arrangements do not constitute a pure inflation
targeting system, since the Bank is also instructed to give some regard to
general economic policy goals, which presumably means avoiding excessive
movements in real output as well as inflation. The Bank has not been in-
structed as to the relative weight it should place on inflation and other policy
goals This means that monetary policy is still far from a purely technical or
mechanical process. There is still considerable room for disagreement over
the stance of policy given the lack of definition of goals. The Bank has
instrument independence but not goal independence.
Our paper touches on a number of issues in the literature on monetary
policy. There is a large literature on the usefulness of trying to characterise
monetary policy in terms of a rule that started with Taylor (1992). More
recently, Orphanides (2003) has provided a historical analysis and has been
able to show that there is a degree of consistency in the conduct of US mon-
etary policy during the 1920s and since the 1951 accord that gave effective
independence to the Federal Reserve. In many cases across the world, the
Taylor rule provides an useful way of analysing policy.
However, as another theme running through much of the policy discussion
has concerned the potential use of simple monetary rules such as those advo-
cated by Taylor (1993). To some extent the use of a simple rule assumes the
sort of well defined preferences which are conspicuously absent in the current
monetary arrangement. However, simple rules have a number of advantages
chiefly, perhaps, by making the operation of monetary policy transparent
and therefore easily monitored by the private sector. The question remains
as to what form such a simple rule should take. Taylor conditions short
term interest rates on current deviations of output and inflation from target
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while Svensson (1997) argues that, given the long and variable lags inherent
in policy, it might make more sense to target a forecast of inflation rather
than its current value. Orphanides (1998) has also pointed out that deci-
sions about interest rates are made in real time when there is considerable
uncertainty about the current state of the economy. Policymaking in cir-
cumstances when information is partial has been laid out fully in Pearlman
(1992). In this paper we assume that the filtering which is required of current
(imperfect) measure of economic activity takes place as part of the internal
procedures of the Bank of England (see Budd (1995) for a description).
In this paper we take advantage of the considerable volume of informa-
tion that the Bank of England makes available about the decision-making
processes of the Monetary Policy Committee to examine the kinds of policy
rule that the MPC implicitly operates. As has been emphasised repeatedly
by a number of commentators, it is clear that the Bank operates an inflation
forecast type of rule, but with some evidence to suggest that developments
in asset markets also matter.
The contrast between the degree of transparency that the Bank of
England aspires to and the traditional practices of Central Bankers could
not be greater. Transparency serves the need of accountability but it also
improves predictability. We find in this paper that information about the
individual decisions of MPC members improves the predictability of interest
rate changes compared with the case where only the aggregate decision is
known. The heterogeneity across the MPC is valuable information. This
throws some light on the current debate about the extent to which central
banks should make decision making processes as transparent as possible.
The granting of operational independence to the Bank of England in 1997
put in place a mechanism for making decisions on monetary policy based on
a 9 member Monetary Policy Committee made of 5 internal and 4 external
members. Operational decisions on interest rate policy are made by theMPC.
It comprises the Governor of the Bank of England, the two deputy Governors,
two members of the Bank with responsibility in the Bank for monetary policy
and market operations and four outside members with relevant expertise
who are appointed by the Chancellor. The internal members are permanent
appointments while the external serve for a 3 year period, with the possibility
of reappointment. A large amount of information is provided on both the
information set that is at the disposal of the Committee and the eventual vote
that each member casts. This provides an invaluable dataset to study what
is actually the basis for decisions on interest rates. We find that the decision
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making process is best thought of as an inflation forecast regime (Svensson,
1997) but with some responsiveness to asset market developments.
There is now an extensive literature on the role that asset market devel-
opments should play in monetary policy decisions. For example, Bernanke
and Gertler (2000) argue that policy should not respond to changes in assets
prices, except in so far as they signal changes in expected inflation. Cecchetti
et al (2000), by contrast, have argued that monetary policy should respond
to bubbles or misalignments in asset prices1
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we briefly discuss some
simple models of the inflation process and introduce a role for transparency
and for a committee structure for decision-making and cosider the signal
extraction problem that the MPC and the members individually face. In
Section 3 we discuss the estimation problem. In section 4 we report some
empirical results. Finally, in section 5, we present our conclusions.
2 Models of the inflation process
We adopt the most simple form of a model of the monetary policymaking
process and abstract from many issues that have been the focus of much of
the recent literature. The model is structured as follows:
πt = πt−1 + αyt−1 + ǫt (1)
yt = β1yt−1 − β2(it−1 − πt−1) + ηt (2)
πt is the inflation rate in period t, yt is the output gap (the difference
between the log of output and the log of potential output), it is the nominal
interest rate. ηt and εt are iid shocks in period t not observable in period t−1.
The coefficients α and β2 are positive; β1 measures the degree of persistance
in the output gap and satisfies ∈ (0, 1). The output gap depends negatively
on the real lagged interest rate. The (change in the) inflation depends on the
lagged output gap. The output gap is normalised to zero in the long run.
The intertemporal loss function is:
Lt =
1
2
Et
∑
τ=t
δτ−t
[
(πt − π
∗)2
]
+ λy2t (3)
Et denotes expectations conditional on information available in period
t. π∗ is the inflation target; δ, the discount rate satisfies 0 < δ < 1. The
1For other views see Vickers (1999), Goodhart (2001), Bean (2003) and Bullard (2002).
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policymaker minimises the present discounted value of squared deviations of
inflation from its target and the output gap. λ is the weight the policymaker
attaches to the output gap being zero, with the weight on inflation normalised
to one.
For the special case of λ = 0, so the policymaker only targets inflation,
the central bank can (in expectation) use the current interest rate to hit the
target for inflation two periods hence. So perfect controllability in this case
allows the intertemporal problem to be written as a sequence of single period
problems. In this case (Svensson, 1997a)
Lt =
1
2
[
πt+2|t − π
∗
]2
(4)
πt+2|t is the forecast of inflation at time period t+2 based on information
available in period t. The central bank minimises the squared deviation of
the current two-year inflation forecast, πt+2|t, from the target. The forecast
of πt+2 at t is
πt+2|t = πt+1|t + αyt+1|t (5)
and
yt+1|t = β1yt|t − β2(it − πt|t) (6)
where the subscript t|t is indicating that current realisations of the output
gap and inflation may well be imperfectly observed, and need to be forecasted.
So:
πt+2|t = α
[
β1yt|t − β2(it − πt|t)
]
(7)
Then the inflation ‘feed forward’ rule is
it = (πt|t − π
∗) +
1
αβ
πt+1|t +
β1
β2
yt|t (8)
This satisfies the Taylor Principle since ∂it/∂πt > 1.So although there is
not an explicit weight attached to output losses, current (forecasted) ouput
appears in the rule because the current output gap is informative about
future inflation. In Svensson’s original formulation πt|tand yt|t are known. In
practice, as Orphanides (1998) has pointed out, in real time current inflation
and the current output gap are not observed.
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2.1 Committee decision-making
In contrast to the Federal Reserve2 and the ECB, where decision making
is by ’consensus’ , the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England
uses majority voting so it is the median vote that decides the outcome for
monetary policy. One way to model decision making by committee is to
assume that preferences with respect to inflation and output vary across the
committee (Sibert, 2002, Neuman, 2002). In this case we can write a loss
function for the ith committee member as:
Lit =
1
2
Et
∑
τ=t
δτ−t
[
(πt − π
∗)2
]
+ λiy
2
t , for i = 1, ...,m (9)
If we confine ourselves to the case considered earlier when only inflation
matters, preference heterogeneity is meaningless. Instead we assume that
heterogeneity arises from differing views about the state of the economy. Each
member has the same (public) information set but will augment this with
private information. This can take different forms. An individual member
may dissent from the consensus forecast or an individual member may have
particular expertise that leads to more weight being attached to particular
kinds of information compared to the average. Since the internal dynamics
of committee decision making can result in a measure of sharing of expertise,
we shall assume that each decision is finally based utimately on information
that cannot be shared fully with the MPC, or which the other members of
the Committee do not attach importance to. The decision rule for the ith
member is:
iit = (πt|t − π
∗) +
1
αβ
πt+1|t +
β1
β2
yt|t + ς it for i = 1, ...,m (10)
ς it is a zero mean process with a diagonal covariance matrix, with diagonal
elements, σ2ςi.
2.2 Information Processing
2See Edison and Marquez (1998) for a detailed description of the decision making
processes of the Federal Open Markets Committee.
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The problem of determining yt|t and πt+1|t (and implicitly the uncertainty
associated with the forecasts) can be cast as an optimal filtering or signal
extraction problem (Holly and Hughes Hallett, 1989). Define the state vector
y˜t = (πt, yt)
′.So that
y˜t = Ay˜t−1 +But + et (11)
where y˜t is a 2× 1 vector, A a 2× 2 matrix, B is 2× 1 vector and ut = it.
et is a 2 × 1 vector of iid shocks. We assume that we observe the current
state of the economy imperfectly so
zt = Hy˜t + ψt (12)
Where E(ψt) = 0 and E(ψ
′
tψt) = Γt and zt is a 2 × 1vector of obser-
vations of the state vector. We want the best estimate of y˜t conditional on
information available, which is y˜t|t.
Prior knowledge of the conditional density of y˜t−1 based on the informa-
tion set Ωt gives
E(y˜t−1 | Ωt) = y˜t−1|t (13)
and
E(y˜t | Ωt) = Ay˜t−1|t +But (14)
the conditional covariance of y˜t−1|t is defined as
Cov(y˜t−1 | Ωt) = Λt−1 (15)
so
Cov(y˜t | Ωt) = AΛt−1A
′ + Γt = Λt (16)
In this framework the time varying quality and reliability of information
is captured by Γt. The solution to this problem provides a way of optimally
updating estimates of y˜t.
y˜t|t = y˜t|t−1 + Ft(zt −Hy˜t|t−1) (17)
where Ft = ΛtH
′(HΛtH
′ + Γt)
−1
7
So the best estimate is a linear combination of the previous best estimate
and on a correction for the difference between the previous estimate and the
latest observations.
The central point from the perspective of monetary control is that the
usefulness of new observations on the economy varies over time. In some
periods with a large Γt, little if any revisions to the optimal estimate of
y˜t|twill take place, so a change in the interest rate setting will not take place.
We assume that this multivariate filtering is the domain of the Bank of
England and the MPC. However, we can also allow for individual members
of the MPC to optimally update their private forecasts. Assume that ς it for
each member follows an autoregressive process.
ς it = θiς it−1 + γit (18)
γit ≈ N(0, σ
2
γ
t
)
and we observe this via
zit = ς it + δit (19)
with
δit ≃ N(0, σ
2
δit
) (20)
Where now z is a scalar. Then the optimal private estimate for the i’th
committee member is
ς it|t = ς it|t−1 + [σ
2
γ
it
/(σ2γ
it
+ σ2δit)] (21)
Again the revisions to private information will vary with the quality of
observations.
The standard separation of observation from control means that these
optimal estimates of y˜t|t and ς it|t can be plugged into the feedback rule given
in equation (10). Note, however, that whereas the form of the feedback rule
is independent of the observation process, the actual interest rate decision is
not. This will be affected by the quality and reliability of the information
that flows into the monetary decision making process.
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3 Data and Econometric models
3.1 The information set and measurement of variables
In this section we turn to an empirical examination of monetary policy in the
UK. In the previous section the model suggested that an inflation forecast
rule has been used and we attempt to test for this using information provided
regularly by the Bank of England in the Inflation Report. We collected
information on the kinds of data that the MPC looked at for each monthly
meeting. Not all of this information is made use of in this paper but the
important thing was to ensure that we conditioned only on what information
was actually available at the time of each meeting.
Our dependent variable is the change in base rate agreed by the MPC at
each of its meetings, from June 1997 to December 2003; these meetings are
monthly and held in the first week of each month, except September 2001
when an additional meeting was held following the events on September 11.
Our study of heterogeneity among the members of the MPC is based on deci-
sions of the individual members. The source for these data are the minutes of
the MPC meetings. We evaluate our models using data on monthly meetings
in 2004.
Assessing monetary policy decisions in the presence of uncertainty about
forecast levels of inflation and the output gap (including uncertainty both
in forecast output levels and perception about potential output) requires
collection of real-time data available to the policymakers when interest rate
decisions are made as well as measures of forecast uncertainty. This contrasts
with many studies of monetary policy which are based on realised (and subse-
quently revised) measures of economic activity (see Orphanides, 2002). The
extent to which there is uncertainty about the forecast of the Bank of Eng-
land can be inferred from the fan charts published in the Inflation Report
(Britton, et al, 1998).
We also collected information on unemployment (where this typically
refers to unemployment three months prior to the MPC meeting, as well
data on the underlying state of asset markets (housing prices, share prices and
exchange rates). We measure unemployment by the year-on-year change in
ILO rate of unemployment, lagged 3 months. The ILO rate of unemployment
is computed using 3 months rolling average estimates of the number of ILO-
unemployed persons and size of labour force (ILO definition), both collected
from the ONS Labour Force Survey. Housing prices are measured by the
9
year-on-year growth rates of the Nationwide housing prices index (seasonally
adjusted) for the previous month (Source: Nationwide). Share prices and
exchange rates are measured by the year-on-year growth rate of the FTSE
100 share index and the effective exchange rate respectively at the end of the
previous month (Source: Bank of England). The other current information
included in the model is the current level of inflation; this is measured by the
year-on-year growth rate of RPIX headline inflation lagged 2 months (Source:
ONS).
Our model also includes expected rates of future inflation and forecasts
of current and future output. One difficulty with using the Bank’s forecasts
of inflation is that they are not really informative. By definition, the Bank
targets inflation over a two year horizon, so it always publishes a forecast
in which (in expectation) inflation hits the target in two years time. To
do anything else would be internally inconsistent. Instead, as a measure
of future inflation, we use the 4 year ahead inflation expectations implict in
bond markets at the time of the MPC meeting, data on which can be inferred
from the Bank of England’s forward yield curve estimates obtained from
index linked bonds. For output, we use the Bank of England’s model based
mean quarterly forecasts of current and one-year-ahead GDP. As a measure
of forecast uncertainty, we use the standard deviation of the one-year-ahead
forecast. These measures are obtained from the Bank of England’s fan charts
of output; details regarding these measures are discussed elsewhere (Britton
et al., 1998).
3.2 An interval censoring model of base rate changes
Interest rate changes are highly clustered, with a majority of the meetings
proposing no change in the base rate (see Figure 1). For the Bank of England
MPC over the period of our analysis, 69 per cent of the meetings proposed
that the base rate be maintained at its current level, 12 per cent recommended
a rise of 25 basis points, 14 per cent recommended a reduction of 25 basis
points, and 5 per cent a reduction of 0.50 per cent. This clustering has to be
taken into account while studying decisions of the MPC. In this paper, we use
an interval regression framework for analysis; other authors have used other
limted dependent variable frameworks, like the logit/ probit or multinomial
logit/ probit framework (for a recent contribution, see Chevapatrakul et al.,
2001, and Gascoigne and Turner, 2003). Our choice of model is based on
considerations of being able to utilize complete information available in the
10
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Figure 1:
monetary policy decisions, and problems relating to model specification and
interpretation of multinomial logit models (Greene, 1993). We also explored
a multinomial logit formulation, and found the broad empirical conclusions
to be similar.
The interval regression formulation (Amemiya, 1973) is a generalisation
of the tobit model where the truncation in the dependent variable is possi-
bly different for different observation units, and the truncation cut-offs are
known. The observed dependent variable in our case,△rt,obs, is the truncated
version of the latent monetary policy response variable, △rt, where
△rt,obs = −0.5 if △rt ∈ (−∞,−0.375)
= −0.25 if △rt ∈ [−0.375,−0.20)
= 0 if △rt ∈ [−0.20, 0.20]
= 0.25 if △rt ∈ (0.20, 0.375]
= 0.5 if △rt ∈ (0.375,∞)
The wider truncation interval when interest rates are maintained (ie., for
△rt,obs = 0) may be interpreted as reflecting the conservative stance of mon-
etary policy under uncertainty about forecast future output.
Under this observation scheme, we estimate the following model of MPC
inflation targeting:
△rt = α+ βπ.πt + βEπ.Eπt + βy0.yt + βy1.Eyt
+βσ.σ (yt) + λ
/.Zt−1 + εt,
11
where Zt−1 represents current observations on unemployment (△ut) and the
underlying state of the asset markets (Phsg,t, PFTSE,t and Pexch,t). The term
involving σ (yt) is included to incorporate the notion that the stance of mone-
tary policy may depend on the uncertainty relating to forecast future levels of
output and inflation. As was shown in the previous section increased uncer-
tainty about the current state of the economy will tend to bias policy towards
caution in changing interest rates. In particular, this strand of the literature
suggests that optimal monetary policy may be more cautious (rather than
activist) under greater uncertainty in the forecast or real-time estimates of
output gap and inflation (Issing, 2002; Aoki, 2003; and Orphanides, 2003).
Since, as previously discussed the published inflation forecast is not infor-
mative, we confined ourselves to uncertainty relating to forecast of future
output growth.
3.3 Model of base rate changes with heterogeneity among
members
Each member of the MPC arrives at his/ her own decision regarding interest
rates, and consensus interest rate decisions are arrived at by voting on these
individual proposals. In addition to consensus decisions, the Bank of Eng-
land also publishes interest rate change proposals of each individual member
of the MPC. The voting pattern of individual members of the MPC suggests
substantial systematic differences across the committee3. These data on in-
dividual votes offers the opportunity to examine the voting pattern in MPC
meetings, and resulting consensus decision that is arrived at as a consequence.
In the model of section 2 we have suggested that uncertainty about fore-
casts will affect monetary policy decisions. Moreover, that there will be
heterogeneity in the way individual members incorporate this uncertainty
about future levels of output (or different notions about full employment
3For example, of the 37 meetings which Allsopp attended, the votes for 11 were against
the consensus decision, and all of these were for a lower interest rate. Similarly, Julius
voted against the consensus motion in 14 of the 45 meetings; all of these in favour of a
lower interest rate. Wadhwani disagreed 13 out of 37 times, each time in favour of a lower
interest rate. On the other hand, King voted for a higher interest rate in 12 of the 82
meetings. Buiter disagreed from the consensus decision in 17 meetings out of 36, voting on
8 ocassions for a lower interest rate and 9 times in favour of a higher one. Nickell favoured
a different interest rate decision in 10 of the 46 meetings; 6 for a lower interest rate and 4
for a higher interest rate.
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level of future output) into their decisions. This appears to justify a model
of individual MPC members’ decisions, where there may be heterogeneity in
the effect that σ (yt) has on the interest rate decisions (ie., the coefficient
βσ).
Under a similar interval regression framework as above, we would then
have the model:
△rit = α+ βπ.πt + βEπ.Eπt + βy0.yt + βy1.Eyt
+βσi.I [i ∈MPCt] .σ (yt) + λ
/.Zt−1 + εit,
where I [i ∈MPCt] is the indicator that member i was present at the MPC
meeting on date t, and βσi represents the responsiveness of member i’s deci-
sion to uncertainty in future output. The latent variables △rit are assigned
to intervals in the same way as earlier4. E denotes the expected/forecasted
value for inflation and output.
This fixed effects specification, however, cannot capture one important
aspect of the heterogeneity in the decision processes of MPC members —
namely, the degree of activism. As noted earlier, some MPC members’ deci-
sions are characterized by a greater degree of variability than some others’5.
A convenient way of modeling the decision processes of MPC members would
be through a random effects model. We consider the following model:
△rit = α+ βπ.πt + βEπ.Eπt + βy0.yt + βy1.Eyt
+λ/.Zt−1 + (β
∗
σ + βσi) .I [i ∈MPCt] .σ (yt) ,(
β∗σ
βσi
)
˜N
[(
µ
µi
)
,
(
σ2 σ0i
σ0i σ
2
i
)]
,
0 = nµ+
I∑
i=1
niµi,
βσi’s are independent of each other,
where β∗σ represents the typical response of monetary policy to uncertainty,
βσi is the response of the specific MPC member
6, and n and ni’s are the total
4There was one ocassion when an MPC member voted for a reduction of 40 basis points;
this case we assigned to the interval [−0.525,−0.275).
5Buiter and Nickell are prominent examples. Both have disagreed from the consensus
interest rate decisions in a substantial number of meetings, but their proposals have not
been predominantly above or below the consensus decision.
6Note that it is not necessary to assume that β∗σ and βσi are independently distributed,
but that they are jointly normally distributed.
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number of meetings, and the number of meetings that member i attends re-
spectively7. This is a convenient framework, since this allows the segregation
of the uncertainty term into two parts, one that is common to all members,
and the other incorporates the heterogeneity.
We assume that new MPC members go with the general flow for a period
of time (the first 3 meetings in our case) before their individual views start
getting expressed8. Thus, we can use the votes in these three initial meetings
to estimate µ and σ2, and votes in the subsequent meetings to estimate the
individual specific heterogeneity parameters. We further assume that σ (yt)
is uncorrelated with the other regressors9, so that we can first estimate the
regression△rit = α+βπ.πt+βEπ.Eπt+βy0.yt+βy1.Eyt+λ
/.Zt−1+uit (using
some heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator), then use the computed resid-
uals to construct ûit/σ (yt+12) , and then compare the means in an analysis
of variance (ANOVA) framework, taking specific care that the differences in
variance for different levels of the design variable (in this case, one for each
member and a common effect corresponding to β∗σ) are adjusted for. In this
way, we can identify significant contrasts between µ and the µi’s, and be-
tween different µi’s, while allowing the variances of the heterogeneity term
to differ across the members.
7A more typical application of random effects would have been through the model
△rit = α + βπ.πt + βEπ.Eπt + βy0.yt + βy1.Eyt + λ
/.Zt−1 + uit, where uit =
βσi.I [i ∈MPCt] .σ (yt)+εit, βσi˜N
(
µi, σ
2
i
)
, εit˜N
(
0, σ2
)
, εit and βσi independently dis-
tributed. However, this model is not identifiable. One can only work with this model if
σ2 = 0, which is not satisfactory.
8Some recent work (see, for example, Sibert, 2003) would suggest that such an assump-
tion is justifiable. This appears to be justified in the present context of members of the
Bank of England MPC. The first vote against the motion for the 19 MPC members have
been in meeting number (1, 1, 2, 4, 4, 5, 8, 8, 8, 9, 9, 9,9+, 10, 18, 19, 20, 23, 74+) (+ denotes
censored to the right). Further, none of the 19 members have proposed an interest rate
lower than the consensus decision within the first 3 meetings.
9This is not an unreasonable assumption; the squared multiple correlation coefficient of
σ (yt+12) on all the other regressors is 0.336 and that on the two expected output terms is
only 0.054, while the correlation coefficient between σ (yt+12) and Eyt+12 is only −0.096.
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3.4 Another alternative random effects model
Consider the following random coefficients model:
△rit = α+ βπ.πt + βEπ.Eπt + βy0.yt + βy1.Eyt
+λ/.Zt−1 + βσ,it.I [i ∈MPCt] .σ (yt) + εit,
βσ,it are random coefficients independent of each other and of εit,
βσ,it˜N
(
µi, σ
2
i
)
, εit˜N
(
0, σ2
)
.
Under a interval regression framework as above, first estimate the slope-
heterogeneity fixed effects model:
△rit = α+ βπ.πt + βEπ.Eπt + βy0.yt + βy1.Eyt
+λ/.Zt−1 + βσi.I [i ∈MPCt] .σ (yt) + εit.
Then, evaluate significance of contrasts, using
β̂σ,it =
ε̂it
σ (yt+12)
+ β̂σi
as a pseudo-sample from the distribution of βσ,it.
This would constitute another way to identify significant contrasts be-
tween µ and the µi’s, and between different µi’s, while allowing the variances
of the heterogeneity term to differ across the members.
4 Results
4.1 Consensus decisions of the MPC
Table 1 presents parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit measures for the es-
timated model for overall MPC interest rate decisions. These are the change
in interest rates that are actually implented. Results using OLS and interval
regression are presented here; the implications of estimates of a multinomial
logit model are similar, but are not presented because these results are not
directly comparable. It is clear that expected inflation and expected output
matter for the interest rate decision, with currently observed inflation and
output playing no role. This confirms the assertion of section 2 that the
Bank of England follows an inflation forecast regime. It is also noticeable
that movements in the stock market play a significant role. The coefficients
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on unemployment, house price inflation and the exchange rate have the right
sign but are not significant. Output uncertainty has the expected sign, more
uncertainty yends to militate against a change in interest rates, but it is not
significant.
TABLE 1: Inflation Targeting Model Estimates,
Consensus MPC Interest Rate Decisions
Variables Ordinary Interval
Least Squares Regression
πt 0.016 0.022
Eπt 0.068
∗ 0.088∗
yt 0.001 0.033
Eyt 0.145
∗∗ 0.192∗∗
△ut -0.077 -0.049
Phsg,t 0.976
+ 1.246
PFTSE,t 0.305
+ 0.731∗∗
Pexch,t 0.005 0.007
σ (yt) -0.231 -0.200
constant -0.543 -0.864∗
Number of meetings 82 82
Goodness of fit F (9, 72) = 5.82 Wald χ2(9) = 175.42
Prob. > F = 0.0000 Prob. > χ2 = 0.0000
R
2 = 0.4955 Log pseudo-likelihood = −52.1030
Notes: 1. ∗∗,∗ ,+: Significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level respectively.
4.2 Decisions of individual members with fixed effects
heterogeneity
Table 2 presents interval regression parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit
measures for the estimated model of MPC members’ interest rate decisions.
In this case we are exploiting the extra information that is provided by the
published voting records of each of the Committee members. In addition to
taking advantage of the heterogeneity in individual members’ decisions, we
also estimated a model where the members belong to two types, depending on
whether they are internal members (from the Bank of England) or external
MPC members.
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TABLE 2: Inflation Targeting Model Estimates,
Individual MPC Members’ Interest Rate Decisions
Variables Heterogeneity: Heterogeneity: No
Indiv. members Int. vs. Ext. heterogeneity
πt -0.023 (0.331) -0.019 (0.436) -0.020 (0.436)
Eπt 0.092 (0.000)
∗∗ 0.089 (0.000)∗∗ 0.089 (0.000)∗∗
yt 0.000 (0.999) -0.009 (0.593) -0.011 (0.513)
Eyt 0.205 (0.000)
∗∗ 0.202 (0.000)∗∗ 0.199 (0.000)∗∗
△ut -0.158 (0.001)
∗∗ -0.163 (0.001)∗∗ -0.164 (0.001)∗∗
Phsg,t 1.587 (0.000)
∗∗ 1.886 (0.000)∗∗ 1.885 (0.000)∗∗
PFTSE,t 0.655 (0.000)
∗∗ 0.691 (0.000)∗∗ 0.694 (0.000)∗∗
Pexch,t 0.006 (0.000)
∗∗ 0.006 (0.000)∗∗ 0.006 (0.000)∗∗
σ (yt) -0.308 (0.194)
— × Allsopp -0.242 (0.312)
— × Barker -0.164 (0.500)
— × Bean -0.163 (0.497)
— × Bell -0.219 (0.374)
— × Budd -0.112 (0.637)
— × Buiter -0.184 (0.442)
— × Clementi -0.169 (0.478)
— × George -0.175 (0.463)
— × Goodhart -0.170 (0.476)
— × Julius -0.301 (0.202)
— × King -0.131 (0.581)
— × Lambert -0.198 (0.450)
— × Large -0.077 (0.753)
— × Lomax -0.136 (0.600)
— × Nickell -0.177 (0.463)
— × Plenderleith -0.183 (0.442)
— × Tucker -0.098 (0.687)
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TABLE 2 Contd.: Inflation Targeting Model Estimates,
Individual MPC Members’ Interest Rate Decisions
Variables Heterogeneity: Heterogeneity: No
Indiv. members Int. vs. Ext. heterogeneity
— × Vickers -0.137 (0.563)
— × Wadhwani -0.287 (0.227)
— × INTERNAL -0.274 (0.243)
— × EXTERNAL -0.341 (0.149)
constant -0.828 (0.001)∗∗ -0.717 (0.005)∗∗ -0.697 (0.007)∗∗
No. of
member-meetings 696 696 696
Goodness of fit:
Wald χ2 χ2(27) = 1182.01 χ2(10) = 1162.74 χ2(9) = 1077.37
Prob. > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log pseudo-
likelihood −495.4422 −518.4123 −534.7516
1. p-values in parentheses.
2. ∗∗,∗ ,+: Significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level respectively.
3. Joint significance of the 19 individual member heterogeneity terms (LRT):−2. lnL =
79.444, 19 d.f., p-value 0.000.
4. Joint significance of the INTERNAL and EXTERNAL heterogeneity terms (LRT):
−2. lnL = 46.868, 2 d.f., p-value 0.000.
The broad conclusions from the model are similar to those for the overall
decisions of the MPC. However, we now find that developments in asset
markets do have a significant role to play in monetary policymaking. None
of the heterogeneity coefficients are individually significant, but they are
jointly significant. However, the signs of the heterogeneity parameters are in
the direction of our a priori expectations.
4.3 Decisions of individual members with random ef-
fects heterogeneity
The fixed effects estimates obtained in the previous subsection were not en-
tirely satisfactory for two reasons. First, none of the estimated heterogeneity
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coefficients were significant at the 10 percent level, and second, this setup
does not allow us to explore individual specific heterogeneity after controlling
for the ”activism” issue apparent in some MPC members. Further, these two
issues may indeed be related; while the lack of significance may be a sample
size issue, we would like to control for the differences in variance in a random
effects framework to have a closer look at the contrasts.
Table 3 reports estimates of our random effects model.
TABLE 3: Inflation Targeting Model Estimates,
Individual MPC Members’ Interest Rate Decisions — Random Effects
Variables µ̂+ µ̂i V ar (β
∗
σ + βσi)
Allsopp 0.1452-0.7294+ 0.1517
Barker 0.1452-0.3270 0.1446
Bean 0.1452-0.2593 0.1197
Bell 0.1452-0.8361 0.1256
Budd 0.1452+0.2538 0.1541
Buiter 0.1452-0.0870 0.2070
Clementi 0.1452-0.0189 0.1389
George 0.1452-0.1146 0.1317
Goodhart 0.1452+0.0549 0.1317
de Julius 0.1452-0.7718∗∗ 0.1303
King 0.1452+0.1644 0.1373
Lambert 0.1452+0.0000 0.1569
Large 0.1452+0.2783 0.1717
Lomax 0.1452+0.0000 0.1569
Nickell 0.1452-0.3346 0.1635
Plenderleith 0.1452-0.0444 0.1383
Tucker 0.1452+0.0006 0.1210
Vickers 0.1452+0.1279 0.1642
Wadhwani 0.1452-0.7698∗ 0.1534
1. ∗∗,∗ ,+: Significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level respectively.
2. The estimates do not explicitly assume independence of β∗σ and βσi.
3. Other significant contrasts are: µKing − µAllsopp : 0.8938
∗∗, µKing − µBell :
1.0275+, µKing−µJulius : 0.9362
∗∗, µKing−µWadhwani : 0.9342
∗∗,and µClementi−
µJulius : 0.7529
∗.
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The estimates in Table 3 capture several of the interesting features of
heterogeneity discussed earlier. There are several significant contrasts, both
with respect to the typical average response of monetary policy µ and be-
tween member-specific average responses (µi’s), and that the estimates reflect
the expected direction of these contrasts. The degree of “activism” in any
member is reflected in the estimated variance of β∗σ + βσi. For example,
Willem Buiter is the most activist of all MPC members, but he did not have
a particular bias in favour of lower or higher interest rates on average. By
contrast, Anna de Julius had a significant bias in favour of lower interest
rates, along with Christopher Allsop but they were more activist thatn the
average. Charlie Bean stands out as being both close on average to the actual
MPC decision and the least activist. Thus, this appears to be a reasonable
model of monetary policy decision-making in the presence of uncertainty.
4.4 Forecast performance of the estimated models
The comparison of actuals and (in sample) predicted decisions of the MPC,
in terms of level of the base rate and interest rate changes are shown in
Figures 1 and 2 respectively. These predictions based on estimates in Table
1, ie., they do not incorporate heterogeneity in the decisions of the individual
MPC members.
Figure 1 indicates good conformity between the model predictions and
the actual level of the base rate. Figure 2 indicates that monetary policy
decisions follow the direction predicted by our model, while at the same
time indicating a degree of cautiousness in policy. To explore whether such
policy cautiousness may be reflected in the heterogeneity of the individual
MPC members’ decisions, we use the model with fixed effects heterogeneity
to predict the decisions of individual members (and consequently consensus
decisions of the committee) for the first two months of 2004. These out-of-
sample predictions are summarised in Tables 4a, 4b and 4c. The estimated
model predicts MPC decisions fairly well.
TABLE 4a: Predictions of MPC Members’ Decisions, January 2004
Actual: 0.00 Actual: 0.25
Predicted: 0.00 5 0 5
Predicted: 0.25 3 1 4
8 1 9
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TABLE 4b: Predictions of MPC Members’ Decisions, February 2004
Actual: 0.00 Actual: 0.25
Predicted: 0.00 0 2 2
Predicted: 0.25 0 7 7
0 9 9
TABLE 4c: Predictions of MPC Consensus Decisions
Meeting Actual Predicted
January 2004 0.00 0.00
February 2004 0.25 0.25
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have considered the conduct of UK monetary policy from
1997. Since then the Bank of England has had operational independence
and decisions on interest rates made by the majority verdict of a Monetary
Policy Committee. An enormous amount of information is provided about
the data made available to the MPC and the decisions on interest rates
decided upon by individual members. We find that an inflation forecast
regime best describes what the MPC does but we also find an important role
for developments in foreign exchange, equity and housing markets, once we
exploit the extra information that is available in the individual voting records
of MPC members. A role can also be found for unemployment.
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